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HARD QUESTIONS AND INNOCENT CLIENTS:
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE
THREE HARDEST QUESTIONS, AND THE
PLEA BARGAINING PROBLEM
Alice Woolley*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In almost any area of legal counseling and advocacy, the lavyer
may be faced with the dilemma of either betraying the confidential
communications of his client or participating to some extent in the
purposeful deception of the court.1
What makes an ethical question "hard"? In his classic article,
ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, Monroe Freedman began by suggesting that a hard
ethical question arises where a lawyer must choose between betraying
his client's confidences and deceiving the court.2 As that article and
Freedman's other academic work make clear, however, the conflict
between confidentiality and candor is only one source of hard questions.
In Freedman's scholarship, a "hard" question arises where any answer to
that question permits a lawyer to pursue a moral value but also requires
another moral value to be sacrificed.' The question is hard because it
places moral values in irreducible conflict. The lawyer has no
* Faculty of Law, University of Calgary. The author would like to thank Susan Fortney and
Bruce Green for their invitation to participate in this commemoration of Monroe Freedman's
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions; Abbe
Smith for inspiring this Article both by her representation of Patsy Kelly Jarrett in her 2008 book,
Case of a Lifetime: A Criminal Defense Lawyer's Story, and thoughtful discussion of that
representation; and, of course, the inimitable Monroe Freedman, for his scholarship, inspiration, and
friendship.
1. Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1469 (1965).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., id.
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unambiguous response, morally speaking; whatever she chooses, she
will do both right and wrong.
Critics of The Three Hardest Questions do not focus on this aspect
of Freedman's analysis. Rather, they focus on his position that a lawyer
acts ethically when she discredits truthful witnesses, presents perjured
testimony, and provides advice that prompts her client to lie, arguing
that Freedman promoted lawyer wrongdoing, and in particular deception
of the court.' In doing so, however, they miss Freedman's broader
point, which was not about identifying the correct answer to a series
of hard questions. It was about what makes a question hard and
the conscientious and situation-specific approach lawyers must take in
deciding what to do when faced with one. As Freedman noted,
immorality does not arise from making a choice in response to a
moral dilemma, otherwise "the human condition would be one of guilt
without realistic free will." Rather, "the only immorality lies in failing to
address and to resolve the moral conflict in a conscientious and
responsible manner."5
This Article develops Freedman's analysis of hard questions in
legal ethics. Relying on his broader scholarship, this Article identifies
the moral norms in conflict in hard questions, the nature of the conflict
between those norms that makes questions hard, and how lawyers ought
to decide hard questions.6 Below, this Article argues that in Freedman's
work, hard questions arise when the normative values of the legal system
or of ordinary morality are in irreducible conflict, and the satisfaction of
one value requires the sacrifice of another.7 Hard questions are different
from crummy situations-where circumstances force a lawyer to
compromise her pursuit of moral values, but neither commits a serious
moral wrong nor accomplishes any moral good. They are also different
from moral mistakes-where a lawyer commits a moral wrong, but for
no good or defensible reason. The lawyer faced with a hard question
must make a conscientious choice about what to do in light of the
specific circumstances in which the question arose, and she must be
prepared to defend that choice in light of those circumstances and the
values at stake.
This Article then applies the hard question analysis to the
obligations of defense lawyers in plea bargaining, arguing that plea
4. Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55
GEo. L.J. 1030, 1042-47 (1967) (discussing the reaction to his Three Hardest Questions).
5. Monroe H. Freedman, A Lawyer Doesn't Always Know Best, HUM. RTS., May 1978, at
28, 28 (1978).
6. See infra Part lI.D.
7. See infra Part IH.D.
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bargaining creates crummy situations for lawyers, and may lead to moral
mistakes, but it also produces hard questions.8 The positive duties of
defense lawyers to facilitate plea bargains in their clients' interests,9 and
to both inform and respect client decision-making, 0 when combined
with the structural weaknesses and inadequacies of the criminal justice
system, mean that in some circumstances lawyers have to choose
between, on the one hand, acting in their clients' best interests and, on
the other hand, refusing to participate in an injustice and
misrepresentation to the court. They may also have to choose between
ensuring a client makes a wise decision and ensuring that it is in fact
their client who makes the decision. That is, if they act in their clients'
best interests they will participate in an injustice and misrepresentation
to the court, but if they refuse to participate in an injustice or
misrepresentation to the court they will sacrifice their clients' best
interests. If they respect their clients' decision-making, their clients'
decisions may be foolish or irrational.
Hard questions in plea bargaining arise when (1) the defense lawyer
represents a factually or legally innocent client; 1 (2) the client
nonetheless faces a reasonable likelihood of conviction at trial and, if
convicted, severe punishment; and (3) the client has received a favorable
but nonetheless punitive plea offer from the prosecutor. 12 In that
situation, accepting the plea is in the client's best interests, but the plea
is also substantively unjust because the client will be punished despite
being factually or legally innocent. Further, the client may be unable to
make a rational assessment of the offer, and of what will happen if she
proceeds to trial. The lawyer may have to choose between ensuring the
client ends up with a positive outcome and truly respecting the client's
decision-making. Finally, the client will mislead the court because she
will falsely attest to guilt, and the lawyer will participate in that
deception. A lawyer thus cannot simultaneously pursue the client's best
interest, respect client autonomy, avoid participating in an injustice, and
ensure that she does not mislead the court.
In the view of this Article, the best choice for a defense lawyer
faced with this question is to create the best possible result for a client,
even if it means participating in an injustice, and even if it involves

8. See infra Part Ill.
9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
10. Id.

11. In other words, a client who did not commit the acts giving rise to the charge or where the
client committed the acts but nonetheless merits acquittal given the constitutional or other
arguments available.
12. Freedman, supra note 1, at 1471.
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pushing the client to a particular choice. That opinion depends very
much on the facts, however, and in any event is less important than
emphasizing that the lawyer negotiating a plea bargain for the legally or
factually innocent client must answer these hard questions. The lawyer
ought to answer conscientiously, in light of the moral and ethical values
at stake in the specific circumstances, and with full moral responsibility.
Regardless of the answer he gives, an important moral value (or values)
is sacrificed.
II.

WHAT MAKES A QUESTION "HARD"?

A.

IrreducibleMoral Conflicts

The lawyer is an officer of the court, participatingin a searchfor
truth. Yet no lawyer would consider that he had acted unethically in
pleading the statute offrauds or the statute of limitations as a bar to a
just claim. Similarly, no lawyer would consider it unethical to prevent
the introduction of evidence such as a murder weapon seized in violation
of the fourth amendment or a truthful but involuntary confession, or
to defend a guilty man on grounds of denial of a speedy trial. Such
actions are permissible because there are policy considerations that at
times justify frustrating the search for truth and the prosecution of a
just claim.13

In his scholarship, Freedman explored the ethical dilemmas of
lawyers and how those dilemmas ought to be resolved. This was the
situation most famously for defense lawyers in The Three Hardest
14
Questions, but he also considered the ethical dilemmas of prosecutors,
civil practitioners, 5 cause lawyers, 6 and securities lawyers.' 7 Further, he
returned continually to the moral content of the lawyer's role and the
moral criteria relevant for informing lawyer's decisions in relation to
issues such as client selection, client advising, and candor.' 8
13. Id. at 1482.
14. Freedman, supra note 4, at 1034-41.
15. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Civil Practitioner. Teaching
Legal Ethics in the Contracts Course,21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 569, 570 (1969).

16. Monroe H. Freedman, The LitigatingAttorney and Social Reform, 1 MD. L.F., 1970, at
13, 14.
17. Monroe H. Freedman, A Civil LibertarianLooks at Securities Regulation, 35 01O ST.
L.J. 280, 280-81 (1974).
18. See Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of PhilosophizingAbout Lawyers' Ethics, 25 GEO.

J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 92-103 (2012) [hereinafter Freedman, PhilosophizingAbout Lawyers'Ethics];
Monroe H. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers' Advocacy?, 2 Soc. REsP. 31,
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In so doing, Freedman revealed certain central preoccupations and
positions relevant to the analysis here. 9 Most importantly, he rejected
the position that true-hard--ethical problems could be resolved without
cost.2° In his view, at certain points in the discharge of her professional
responsibilities a lawyer will have to choose which ethical value to
pursue and which to abandon. 21 He saw the legal system as involving
trade-offs in values and the lawyer as occupying the center of those
trade-offs in many cases. 22 A lawyer whose client insists on testifying
untruthfully could choose to respect client confidentiality and the
client's right to counsel or be candid with the court. The lawyer could
not, however, do all three. 23 A lawyer who identifies a legal argument
that benefits her client but is not in the long-term interests of the system
as a whole could choose between pursuing the client's legitimate legal
interests or the collective legal interests of society; she could not do
both. 24 A range of values from the moral norms of the legal system and
society as a whole can make a justifiable claim against the lawyer in a
given situation, but in some cases, the pursuit of one can only occur at
the expense of another.2 5

35 (1976) [hereinafter Freedman, Public Interest Limits]; Monroe H. Freedman, Client-Centered
Lawyering- What It Isn't, 40 HOFSTRA L. REv. 349, 350-51 (2011) [hereinafter Freedman, ClientCentered Lawyering]; Monroe H. Freedman, Counseling the Client: Refreshing Recollection or
Prompting Perjury, LITIG., Spring 1976, at 36 [hereinafter Freedman, Counseling the Client];
Monroe H. Freedman, Erroneous Disclosure of DamagingInformation: A Response to Professor
Andy Perlman, 14 GEo. MASON L. REv. 179, 181-82 (2006) [hereinafter Freedman, Erroneous
Disclosure];Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1717, 1724-27 (2002) [hereinafter Freedman, Interests of Justice]; Monroe H. Freedman, In
Praise of Overzealous Representation-Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other
Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 771, 773-77 (2006) [hereinafter Freedman, Overzealous
Representation];Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel'sSearchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060,
1064 (1975) [hereinafter Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth]; Monroe H. Freedman,
Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 331, 332 (1987) [hereinafter Freedman,
The Suffering Client]; Monroe H. Freedman, Religion Is Not Totally Irrelevant to Legal Ethics, 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 1299, 1301-02 (1998) [hereinafter Freedman, Religion Is Not Totally Irrelevant];
Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer as Whistle-Blower, 70 PHI DELTA PHI Q., 1974, at 162, 162
[hereinafter Freedman, The Lawyer as Whistle-Blower]; Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral
Obligation of Justification, 74 TEx. L. REv. 111, 111-12 (1995) [hereinafter Freedman, Moral
Obligation of Justification];Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 63, 69 (1996) [hereinafter Freedman, Postmodern Zeal].
19. See supratext accompanying note 18.
20. Freedman, supranote 1, at 1472-73.
21. Freedman, supranote 15, at 576.
22. Id.
23. Freedman, supranote 15, at 575-78.
24. Id. at571-73.
25. See id Although the law governing lawyers takes a particular stance on such situations, it
does not-as noted by Freedman and discussed further below--eliminate the underlying moral
conflict.
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The hard questions identified by Freedman all had this quality.26 A
lawyer must choose one moral value and sacrifice another when
representing a client who seeks to commit perjury or do something "that
is not unlawful, but that is unconscionable";2 7 cross-examining a truthful
witness; advising a client while knowing the client may lie as a result of
the advice; making a legal argument that helps the client but has bad
results for the legal system as a whole; or choosing to take a settlement
knowing that the client would lose if the facts were fully aired at trial.28
To Freedman, lawyers and legal regulators who concentrated on
"such trivia as whether it is ethical to mail out Christmas cards to
clients" and who dealt with "really important ethical issues with
superficial generalities" failed to understand or contribute to the
resolution of ethical problems.29 They either avoided the hard questions
altogether or ducked the moral conflict they created.3" He also expressed
frustration at those who saw ethical problems as susceptible to resolution
by the application of a rule; a rule produced a result, but it did so at the
cost of evading the nature of the ethical problem it supposedly
resolved.3' Focusing on rules as an answer to moral problems assumed a
costless response, without recognizing that the application of a rule is
simply a method for answering a moral dilemma, not an elimination
32
of it.
This position was expressed most clearly in his response to
criticisms of The Three Hardest Questions offered by then-Chief Justice
Burger and U.S. District Attorney for the District of Columbia, David
Bress.33 Burger and Bress argued that a defense lawyer could not
introduce perjured testimony but could attack the credibility of the
truthful witness on cross-examination.34 In Freedman's view, their
response to the hard questions required "rigidly legalistic adherence to
the norms, regardless of the context in which the lawyer may be acting,
26. See Freedman, supra note 1, at 1469. The exception to this proposition is the "hard
questions" Freedman identified with respect to prosecutors. These were not really hard questions.
Rather, they were areas where, contrary to popular belief, the behavior of prosecutors can be fairly
described as unethical. Overcharging to coerce a plea, condoning or covering up police abuses,
suppressing evidence, and similar conduct are bad behavior, not vexing moral issues. Freedman's
point was that making defense counsel more like prosecutors would not necessarily eliminate
unethical behavior. Freedman, supra note 4, at 1035-39.
27. Freedman, supranote 15, at 576.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 578.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Freedman, supranote 4, at 1032-33.
34. Id. at 1033.
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his motives, and the consequences of his act."35 Further, and most
importantly, their response failed to recognize the moral cost of those
choices, the denial of the client's right to confidentiality on the one hand,
and the harm to the truthful witness on the other. As Freedman stated,
"when the lawyer deliberately sets out to destroy the character and
credibility of the truthful prosecutrix, he wreaks untold suffering."36
Whatever the right answer, Freedman argued, you cannot reduce the
moral conflict that the problem creates, or eliminate the moral costs that
any answer imposes.3 7
B.

The Moral Values

The principal themes that motivate my philosophy of lawyers'
ethics, then, are the dignity and sanctity of the individual, compassion
for fellow human beings, individual autonomy, and equal protection of
the laws. And implicit in these is a pervasive ethic of warm zeal in the
38
client's behalf.
Freedman's work also indicated the moral values he saw at play in
the hard questions of legal ethics-that is, the moral values likely to
conflict. Those moral values reflect both values specific to the legal
system and those that apply to human relations more generally.
With respect to the legal system, Freedman emphasized the
normative claims of adversarial justice, specifically its underlying
premise that "an objective, impartial end is sought through selfinterested partisanship."39 The adversary system "is one of the most
efficient and fair methods designed for finding [the truth]" whereby
"[t]he judge or jury is given the strongest case that each side can present,
and is in a position to make an informed, considered, and fair
judgment."4 He also emphasized constitutional values in the Bill of
Rights, in particular the right to counsel and the presumption of
innocence,41 along with the right to confidentiality, which Freedman
argued was a necessary precondition to effective legal representation.4 2

35. Id.at 1046-47.
36. Id. at 1046.
37. Id.at 1047.
38. Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspective, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1131, 1134 (1996).
39. Freedman, supranote 15, at 570.
40. Freedman, Judge Frankel'sSearchfor Truth, supra note 18, at 1065.
41. Freedman, supranote 1, at 1471-72.
42. Id.at 1470.
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Freedman also asserted the significance of broader legal system
values related to the rule of law. He emphasized the extent to which rule
by law-a system of pronounced or ascertainable rules enforced through
a fair and impartial process-serves to protect and respect the dignity
and autonomy of the individual.43 Human dignity is respected because
even the person known to "have committed a heinous offense" is given
due process, and each of us has the freedom to pursue our own
conception of the good within what the law permits.' Autonomy is
respected by the freedom given to individuals within the boundaries of
legality to make their own choices and to pursue their own conception of
the good.45
And, its democratic origins give the law legitimacy as a form of
social settlement-a set of rules within which we are free to establish
our own conception of good:
If, through their constitutionally established processes of democratic
government, the people of this country have determined that particular
instances of industrial pollution are to be tolerated, should lawyers, as
a private elite, choose to reject the democratic will in the course of
representing their clients? By what authority is the46lawyer to deprive
the client of a right that society has chosen to grant?
The structure of legality-both in its substantively enacted norms and in
its processes-provides a salutary check on the risk of abuse of power
by government officials, and a significant role of the lawyer is to ensure
that the law fulfills that function. 4
Along with legal system values, however, Freedman also
emphasized the claim and significance of ordinary morality. 48 Moral
values of honesty and candor, and of dignity and autonomy, apply to
lawyers as much as to others, and when lawyers mislead or misrepresent,
inflict suffering, or impair another person's self or freedom, they violate
those moral norms. In The Three Hardest Questions, Freedman rejected
"the sophistry" of saying that a factually guilty person who pleads "not
'
guilty" is not lying because they are participating in a "legal fiction."49
43. Freedman, Judge Frankel'sSearchfor Truth, supra note 18, at 1063, 1065.
44. Freedman, Public Interest Limits, supra note 18, at 32-33; Freedman, Judge Frankel's
Searchfor Truth, supra note 18, at 1063.
45. Freedman, supra note 5, at 33 (noting the lawyer has a "responsibility to maximize the
client's autonomy by providing the client with the fullest advice and counsel, legal and moral, so
that the client can make the most informed choice possible"); see also Freedman, supra note 38, at
1133 ("As God tells Moses, 'Whoever wishes to err may err."').
46. Freedman, Public Interest Limits, supra note 18, at 34.
47. Id. at 37-39.
48. Freedman, PhilosophizingAbout Lawyers'Ethics, supra note 18, at 97.
49. Freedman, supranote 1, at 1471.
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The lie may be justified, but that does not make it the truth, and it does
not make the moral values of honesty and candor irrelevant to the
functioning of the legal system.5" Indeed, a central justification for the
adversary system, in Freedman's view, was its capacity to result in
discovery of the truth. While truth-telling may be subordinate to other
ends at times, honesty and candor are not rendered morally irrelevant to
lawyer decision-making. 51
Further, in his emphasis on the moral responsibility of lawyers for
their selection of clients and when advising clients, Freedman
incorporated into the lawyer's role the totality of moral claims and
obligations. While a lawyer representing a client has responsibility for
the legal system values specific to that representation, the lawyer could
be subject to legitimate moral criticism for representing morally
undeserving clients or for failing to advise clients as to the extra-legal
moral dimensions of their choices.52 The lawyer has to avoid paternalism
and respect the client's freedom of choice, but the lawyer ought not to
assume that her "function is to maximize the client's material or tactical
position in every way that is legally permissible" without inquiring into
53
whether that is what the client wants.
Finally, Freedman emphasized the moral duties of empathy and
care. For him, the concept of the client that was relevant was not, as
some like Thomas Shaffer argued, that the client had the capacity for
good.54 Rather, Freedman proclaimed, "I think of the client principally
as someone who is in trouble, vulnerable, and in need of my help.15 5 If
Shaffer thought of the client as someone over whom the lawyer had
power, Freedman thought of the client as "one whom I have the power to
help."56 In reflecting on the relationship between his Judaism and his
perspective on ethics, Freedman said, "I stress rachmanut, or
compassion, for a fellow human being who is suffering, even though his
57
suffering may be his own fault.
50. Id.
51. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, supra note 18, at 1065; Freedman, supra
note 15, at 570.
52.

Freedman, Moral Obligation of Justification, supra note 18, at 117 ("[T]his answer

recognizes that the lawyer has the broadest power--ethically and in practice-to decide which
clients to represent. And it insists that the lawyer's decision to accept or reject a particular client is a
moral decision. Moreover, that decision is one for which the lawyer can properly be held morally
accountable.").
53.

Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer as a Hired Gun, in LAWYER'S ETHics 69 (Allan

Gerson ed., 1980).

54.
55.
56.
57.

Freedman, The Suffering Client, supra note 18, at 334.
Id.
Id.
Freedman, supranote 38, at 1133.
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In sum, the answer to the question of which moral values Freedman
thought could be implicated in legal ethics was, all of them. Lawyers
work where people interact with one another, and at the intersection of
the person and the state, they represent the human condition, in all its
richness and variety, and they work within the complex system that we
have developed in order to live with one another with a degree of peace.
In occupying that position, lawyers inevitably confront the moral values
that govern human interactions, and the normative structure that informs
rule by law; whatever it requires in specific circumstances, the lawyer's
role always implicates moral values and requires morally freighted
decisions. This is not to suggest that Freedman viewed the lawyer's role
as without moral structure, or that he saw lawyers as free to do whatever
they saw fit given the mess of competing moral claims relevant to their
conduct. He had a clear perspective on which norms ought to govern,
and how, in matters related to client selection, advising clients, and
advocating for clients.58 What it does mean, however, is that the choices
lawyers make and the things they do implicate a wide range of legal and
moral norms. When the behavioral claims of those norms conflictwhen one norm requires one course of action and the other requires its
opposite-lawyers face hard questions.
C. Answering HardQuestions
I am convinced, however, that a situational approach [to ethical
questions] is the more rational and responsible one. At any rate, we
should no longer delude ourselves that the complexities of what
constitutes responsible professional conduct in the context of an
adversary system can be resolved by syllogistic deductions and vague
canons or dogmaticprescripts.59
The most challenging aspect of Freedman's work, perhaps, is with
respect to his assessment of how lawyers ought to answer hard
questions. His work reflects a consistent set of propositions about
moral decision-making by lawyers, but those propositions appear hard
to reconcile.

58. When selecting a client, all moral or legal system norms can be relevant, and it is the
lawyer's own moral values that ought to determine the choice. When advising a client, moral and
legal norms are relevant, but the choice is the client's, not the lawyer's. When advocating for a
client within the legal system, only legal system norms are relevant, and the paramount norms are
the protection of the client's autonomy and dignity and the respect for constitutional norms in
relation to the right to counsel, the presumption of innocence, and the right of confidentiality.
59. Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047.
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First, while Freedman saw a wide range of values at play in lawyer
decision-making, he had a strong opinion on the relative weight each
value had in determining the right course of action for a lawyer in
particular circumstances. He argued that ordinary morality can
determine lawyer decisions about which clients to represent and play a
part in the advice that a lawyer gives to a client, but that in advocating
for clients the lawyer's decision must conform to the legal system values
that underlie the rule of law in American constitutional democracy.6"
There may be complex and diverse moral values at play or affected by a
lawyer's decision, but that does not mean that each value is of equal
weight and importance in every context.
Second, Freedman had strong opinions on many of the ethical
issues that confront lawyers, in particular on the centrality of zealous
representation of any client the lawyer has chosen to represent. As he put
it, "[o]nce the lawyer has assumed responsibility for a client's case ... it
would be a betrayal of trust for the lawyer to provide that client with less
than what the law allows."6 1 He never changed his mind on the correct
answer to any of the hard questions he identified for the defense
attorney, writing in 2006 that "there are circumstances in which a lawyer
can ethically make a false statement of fact to a tribunal, can ethically
make a false statement of material fact to a third person, and can
ethically engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. 62 Freedman, in other words, thought there were right
answers--or, at least, better and worse answers-to hard questions of
legal ethics.
Third, Freedman rejected models of lawyer ethics that emphasize
the personal responsibility or personal moral judgment of the lawyer
within the lawyer-client relationship. To his mind, while lawyers had
personal responsibility and could exercise personal moral judgment,
particularly when advising or selecting clients, the ultimate moral
decision-maker in the lawyer-client relationship was the client, not the
lawyer. As he put it, lawyers "act both professionally and morally in
assisting clients to maximize their autonomy," and "lawyers act
unprofessionally and immorally in preempting or overriding their
clients' desires. "63

60. Freedman, Public Interest Limits, supra note 18, at 34; Freedman, Client-Centered
Lawyering, supra note 18, at 353-54.
61. Freedman, Public Interest Limits, supra note 18, at 34.
62. Freedman, Overzealous Representation,supra note 18, at 782.
63. Freedman, Client-CenteredLawyering, supra note 18, at 353-54; see also Freedman,
Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 1723; Monroe H. Freedman, PersonalResponsibility in a
ProfessionalSystem, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 192 (1978).
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Fourth, Freedman rejected rule-based approaches to moral decisionmaking. He noted his embrace of civil disobedience where appropriate,
saying, "I was a free person, with moral responsibility, before I was a
lawyer."' He also did not view the rules of professional conduct as
determinative of ethical issues where those rules produced results
contrary to the deeper moral structure of the lawyer's role. He advocated
the ethical correctness of positions inconsistent with the law governing
lawyers, particularly when he argued that misleading or deceiving the
court was a better choice than breaching confidentiality or abandoning
the client who enjoyed a right to counsel.65 In addition, he rejected any
approach to professional responsibility that involved "rigidly legalistic
adherence to norms, regardless of the context in which the lawyer may
be acting, his motives, and the consequences of his act."'" He saw ethical
decisions as situation-specific and not capable of resolution by
"syllogistic deductions and vague canons or dogmatic prescripts." 67
Perhaps, for this reason, Freedman was skeptical about the ability of
moral philosophy to illuminate ethical principles, challenging "anyone to
demonstrate a single significant effect that any moral philosopher has
had on any particular issue of legal ethics."68
As observed earlier, these precepts can seem difficult to reconcile,
particularly to the extent that Freedman rejects both emphasis on the
personal moral responsibility of lawyers and emphasis on rule or normbased decision-making.6 9 How can lawyers be both not personally
responsible and not permitted to follow rules or norms? Further, how can
Freedman argue that ethical decisions are situation-specific while also
taking such strong and unyielding positions on the correct resolution of
ethical issues?
However, identification of a coherent perspective from Freedman's
work is possible. In essence, Freedman's model of moral decisionmaking requires that a lawyer make personal judgments about the right
thing to do, for which she takes responsibility, but it also requires that
she do so in light of the specific circumstances in which she finds
herself, and with particular attention to the normative framework of the
64. Freedman, supra note 38, at 1130.
65. See Freedman, Overzealous Representation, supra note 18, at 774-77; Freedman, supra
note 1, at 1070-71.
66. Freedman, supra note 4, at 1046-47.
67. Id. at 1047.
68. Freedman, Religion Is Not Totally Irrelevant, supra note 18, at 1301; see also Freedman,
Philosophizing About Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 18, at 103 ("When moral philosophers ignore
these practical concerns [about real lawyers and real clients], they produce articles and books that
have no significance in the world of real lawyers and real clients.").
69. See supra Part N.C.
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lawyer's role. Once a lawyer takes on a client, the primary moral values
are the lawyer's loyalty to the client, pursuit of the client's interests, and
respect for the client's decisions. The answer a lawyer gives to a hard
question is one that the lawyer determines for herself and for which she
takes responsibility, but she has an obligation to make it in light of the
norms that govern that particular aspect of the lawyer's role and the
factual circumstances in which the dilemma arises.
This approach explains why Freedman had no difficulty articulating
very different approaches to the allocation of moral responsibility and
the applicable moral principles, in relation to the ethical questions of
client selection, client advising, and advocacy. In his view, each of those
circumstances warrants a different allocation of moral decision-making
and makes different moral values paramount; to identify a singular
approach to all of them would be to miss what is important about each.7 °
Further, even within a specific circumstance (for example, representing
a client at trial) where Freedman himself took a particular position on
the appropriate resolution to the question, the lawyer must still make a
moral decision in light of the totality of the circumstances, for which she
bears responsibility.
Freedman viewed the hard questions of legal ethics as appropriately
resolved in a particular way, but he had no objection to the lawyer who
experienced moral uncertainty or moral conflict in making her own
decision about how to represent a client in a given situation.71 He did
not seek, in considering the hard questions of legal ethics, to identify
a set of rules or guidelines about what lawyers ought to do in those
circumstances. He had a methodology for thinking about ethical
problems, not an answer to every problem that might arise.
In short, Freedman did not object to the thoughtful lawyer trying to
navigate the hard questions of legal ethics, even if that lawyer reached a
different answer than he would. Rather, his objections were to those
critics, particularly those removed from the reality of legal practice, who
saw the moral dilemmas of lawyers as straightforward or as susceptible
to easy resolution through application of rules or precepts.72 He reserved
his most stinging criticisms for those who thought that pursuit of
morality or the interests of justice, or the straightforward application of
the rules in favor of cross-examination or against perjury, could
eliminate the complexity of the lawyer's obligation to practice law
ethically and responsibly.73 Freedman did not mind if someone disagreed
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Freedman, supra note 1, at 1470-73, 1478.
Freedman, supranote 5, at 28-29, 31-32.
Id. at 29-33, 51-52.
Freedman, Philosophizing About Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 18, at 92, 97-99, 103-05;
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with his answer to the moral dilemmas. He only minded if his position
was mischaracterized, the moral structure of the lawyer's role was
not respected, or the difficulty of an issue was obscured in seeking to
resolve it.

74

In sum, then, in Freedman's scholarship, the lawyer's obligation
when faced with a hard question is to make a decision in light of the
specific circumstances, placing particular weight on the normative
values that most appropriately govern in those circumstances and the
nuances of the particular facts giving rise to the question.
D. Hard Questions, Crummy Situations,and Moral Mistakes
In taking Freedman's analysis of hard questions and applying it to
problems beyond those he analyzed, it is important to distinguish hard
questions from other circumstances that can arise for the lawyer in
practice. Specifically, what this Article describes above as crummy
situations and moral mistakes. 75 As noted, a hard question arises when
lawyers face a choice between competing moral values, and to pursue
one moral value they must sacrifice another.76 But, when lawyers
sacrifice a moral value, it is not always because they have been forced to
do so to satisfy other moral demands. Sometimes, lawyers violate moral
norms for no good reason-in which case they commit a moral mistake.
Other times, lawyers fail to fulfill their moral obligations for a reason,
and, while inescapable, it does not foster a moral good-in which case
they have found themselves in a crummy situation. A moral mistake is a
violation of a moral norm unsupported by any claim that the violation
was necessary to fulfill other necessary moral duties. A crummy
situation is a failure to satisfy moral obligations that do not amount to
actual wrongdoing, and which occurs for reasons that, while they cannot
be avoided, also do not involve the pursuit of any other moral value.
Freedman himself was not always careful in distinguishing hard
questions from moral mistakes. In a paper he wrote as a companion to
The Three Hardest Questions, he explored the hard questions for
prosecuting attorneys.77 In fact, however, the paper largely focused on
prosecutorial misconduct, on situations such as prosecutors overcharging
to coerce a plea, condoning or covering up police abuses, suppressing
evidence, or "attempting to preclude resolution of important issues
Freedman, supra note 15, at 576, 578; Freedman, supranote 4, at 1030-33.
74. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 320,

360-63, 375-76 (4th ed. 2010).
75. See supra Parts I, H.A-C.
76. See supra Part 1.
77. See Freedman, supranote 4, at 1031-33.
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by depriving courts of jurisdiction."78 Freedman used these examples
to rebut the position that "defense counsel's ethical problems would
readily be solved if defense attorneys would simply take their guide
from this same standard [that governs prosecutors]." 79 But, in doing so,
and in describing them as hard questions, he obscured his own thesis
because there is nothing hard or confusing about the decision not to
overcharge to coerce a plea, or not condoning or covering up police
abuses. Any other choice is simply wrong, not a response to a perplexing
moral dilemma.
Lawyers make moral mistakes, and they sometimes do so because
of the pressures they face in their practices. The prosecutor
who condones or covers up police abuses may be responding to
personal pressures from within the hierarchy of her office or to her
personal relationship to people in the police department. A lawyer
who commits a serious moral wrong because of those pressures or
relationships nonetheless commits a moral mistake. Doing a bad thing
for an understandable reason does not change the moral character of
your actions.
The difference between a moral mistake and a crummy situation
relates to the magnitude and nature of the wrong done in failing to fulfill
ethical duties, the extent to which the wrong was inescapable rather than
simply understandable, and our acceptance of the wrong as part of the
trade-offs that we make in pursuit of broader social values. If, for
example, we choose to spend public funds on the police rather than on
public defenders, we have to accept that we are compromising the nature
and quality of the defense that accused persons will receive. Indeed, the
classic crummy situation would be the public defenders, or other
publicly funded lawyers, who are expected to carry a caseload beyond
what is consistent with ensuring a thorough and zealous representation
of their clients. There is usually no active misconduct in that situationunlike the prosecutor who covers up police abuses--but the lawyer will
fail to satisfy professional ideals. The lawyer cannot do otherwise. It is,
however, still not a hard question because the underfunded lawyer who
sacrifices professional ideals has not done so in pursuit of another moral
value. Rather, the lawyer has done so due to a lack of choice, and the
circumstances of the lawyer's practice make satisfaction of professional
ideals practically impossible.
There is a limit to this defense to ethically inadequate conduct. At a
certain point, the failure to achieve professional ideals can become
78. Id. at 1035-36.
79. Id. at 1033.
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sufficiently injurious to another person as to constitute wrongful
conduct. In that case, the crummy situation would become a moral
mistake. Nevertheless, in either case, the lawyer would not have faced a
hard question.
E. FinalPoints
Above, Part II explores the nature of hard questions in legal ethics,
arguing that hard questions arise when moral values conflict, that the
moral values relevant to a lawyer include both general moral values and
those specific to accomplishing the rule of law in an American
constitutional democracy, and that the obligation of a lawyer when faced
with a hard question is to make a conscientious decision in light of the
moral values and factual circumstances applicable to the situation in
which the question arose.8" Part III uses this analysis81 to consider the hard
questions for a defense attorney in plea bargaining.
III.

PLEA BARGAINING AND THE INNOCENT CLIENT

I told them I-in my heart, I just couldn't do it. It just-my
conscience and in my heart, and it'sjust morally wrong to say you did
something you know in your heart you didn't do. I couldn't live with
myself ifI did that. I couldn'tjust-Ijust couldn't live with myself. I saw
the pictures of the young man andyou know, just-justfor them to want
me to say that I did something so horriblejust to get out ofprison. I just
couldn't do it.82
Patsy Kelly Jarrett ("Kelly") spent nearly thirty years in prison for
murder and armed robbery, crimes she did not commit, and her
connection to which was supported only by the weakest evidence.83
Kelly's decades in prison were not unavoidable. When first charged, she
was offered a plea of five to fifteen years if she pled guilty to robbery. 8
She declined, putting her trust in the "American system of justice."8 5 In
1986, after Kelly had spent ten years in prison, new lawyers--Claudia
Angelos, a New York University law professor, and her then-student

80. See supraPart II.A-D.
81. See infra Part 1ll.
82. Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast Jun. 17, 2004) (statement of Patsy Kelly
Jarrett).
83. The Plea: Patsy Kelly Jarrett, FRONTLINE PBS (June 17, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/jarret.html.
84. Id.
85. Frontline: The Plea, supra note 82; see also The Plea:Patsy Kelly Jarrett,supranote 83.
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Abbe Smith-won an application for habeas corpus entitling Kelly to
a new trial.86 Pending appeal, prosecutors offered Kelly a second plea
of time served if she would plead guilty to the robbery.87 Again,
Kelly refused.88 The habeas award was reversed on appeal, and Kelly
served another nearly two decades in prison. 89 Twice Kelly could
have been released from jail in much less than thirty years; twice
she refused.
Kelly's case is remarkable, because of her factual innocence and
the length of her incarceration. Abbe Smith, who represented Kelly for
many years prior to her release, describes Kelly's case as exceptional in
relation to her practice as a whole. 9° At the same time, however,
Kelly's case is not aberrational. Other innocent people are accused of
crimes, face the prospect of conviction at trial, and are offered plea
bargains preferable to the sentence they would receive if convicted
at trial. And still, other people, even if factually guilty of a crime,
have circumstances that merit acquittal, whether because of available
defenses or constitutional violations in the gathering of evidence or
otherwise. Yet, they also face the prospect of conviction and are offered
favorable pleas. 91
The argument here is that the lawyers for those accused-the
legally and factually innocent, who face the prospect of conviction at
trial and are offered favorable plea bargains-must resolve hard ethical
questions. The hard questions arise because of the nature of the legal and
ethical duties that lawyers owe to their clients when combined with the
structural frailties in the justice system that make it impossible for those

86.
87.
88.
89.

The Plea: Patsy Kelly Jarrett,supra note 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.

90.

ABBE SMITH, CASE OF A LIFETIME: A CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER'S STORY 228 (2008)

("In more than [twenty-five] years of law practice, I have represented a handful of other clients I
believed to be innocent. I have represented many clients who were not guilty of the crime charged
and many more who, guilty or not, did not deserve to be so harshly punished. In all the time I have
been a lawyer, I have never had another case like Kelly's. I am glad of that. I don't think I could
bear another.").
91. Many who write about plea bargaining have discussed the problem of innocent accused
who take a plea to avoid severe consequences arising from wrongful convictions. See, e.g.,
Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2472-73,
2504-06 (2004); Bruce A. Green, The Right to Plea Bargain with Competent Counsel After Cooper
and Frye: Is the Supreme Court Making the Ordinary CriminalProcess "Too Long, Too Expensive,
and Unpredictable... in Pursuit of Perfect Justice?," 51 DuQ. L. REV. 735, 737-38 (2013);
Stephen J. Schulhoefer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1983 (1992); Ken
Strutin, Truth, Justice and the American Style Plea Bargain, 77 ALB. L. REV. 825, 838 (2014). John
Bowers argues that plea bargaining on behalf of the innocent accused is desirable from a policy
perspective. See John Bowers, Punishingthe Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119-20 (2008).
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lawyers to fulfill all of their legal and ethical duties simultaneously.
When acting for an innocent accused in a plea bargain, a lawyer can act
in his client's best interests, he can avoid participating in an injustice, or
he can avoid misleading the court, but he cannot do all three. The lawyer
may be able to respect his client's decision-making or prevent the client
from making a foolish decision, but he may not be able to do both. The
plea bargaining system creates crummy situations and includes moral
mistakes, but what defense lawyers face when representing these sorts of
clients is a truly hard question.
A.

The Lawyer's Duties in Plea Bargaining

I know what I'd tell my client. "Out is out. Out is out. Get out. Get
out. "I mean-andI tell them that when they're confronted with whether
or not to plead guilty. I don't want to stand next to somebody who's
pleading guilty to a crime they didn't commit, but I don't want to be
standing next to somebody when they're wrongfully convicted of a
charge they-a crime they didn't commit, and get much more time. So I
say--I mean, I'm not shy about trying cases, I'm not shy about fighting
92

the government. But out is out.

Defense lawyers have an ethical, legal, and perhaps even
constitutional duty to assist their clients through the plea bargaining
process. At a general level, the duties of defense lawyers in representing
clients through the plea bargaining process retain the usual features of
the defense lawyer acting for a client-to "zealously assert the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system."93 More specifically, in
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense
Function, the Defense Standards direct defense counsel to be "open, at
every stage of a criminal matter and after consultation with the client, to
discussions with the prosecutor concerning disposition of charges by
guilty plea or other negotiated disposition."94 The Defense Standards
place various obligations on defense counsel participating in disposition
discussions, including that the attorney investigate, that the attorney

92. Frontline,The Plea, supranote 82 (statement of N.Y. defense lawyer, Bruce Barket).
93. It is arguable that a plea bargain is a negotiation and thus subject to the duty that "a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings
with others." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). However, given its
place in the legal system-as a corollary to the criminal trial-it seems more accurate to
characterize the plea bargain as equivalent to advocacy than to negotiation.
94. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION,
Standard 4-6.1(a) (4th ed. 2015); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF
GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2 (3d ed. 1999).
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request disclosure from the prosecutor of "any information that tends to
negate guilt, mitigates the offense or is likely to reduce the punishment,"
and that the attorney ensure that her client "understands any proposed
disposition agreement."95 The attorney "may make a recommendation to
the client regarding disposition proposals, but should not unduly
pressure the client to make any particular decision."96 The attorney also
has an obligation to oppose improper waiver of the client's rights as part
97
of the disposition agreement.
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association Performance
Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation similarly require that
defense attorneys "explore with the client the possibility and desirability
of reaching a negotiated disposition of charges," and that they develop
an "overall negotiation plan," which involves fully exploring the cost
and benefits of a plea agreement with a client. 98 They also note that the
"decision to enter a plea of guilty rests solely with the client, and counsel
should not attempt to unduly influence that decision." 99
The Supreme Court has also linked the conduct of defense attorneys
in plea bargaining to the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel, finding ineffective assistance in cases where lawyers failed
100
to properly advise clients about the consequences of a guilty plea,
where a client declined a plea based on improper advice from counsel, 10 1
and where a lawyer failed to advise a client of the existence of a plea
offer." 2 Some academics have suggested that these cases are sufficient
to impose on lawyers a positive obligation to negotiate effectively in the
plea bargaining process, 103 despite the absence of a constitutional right to
a plea bargain."° Others have suggested that defense lawyers have a
practical obligation to advise their clients in a way that takes into
account the psychological biases associated with plea bargaining and, in
particular, the difficulty for clients in making rational determinations
95.
Standard
96.
97.

ABA

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE:

PROSECUTION

AND DEF.

FUNCTION,

4-6.2(c)-(d).
Id. Standard 4-6.2(e).
Id.Standard 4-6.4(a).

98. PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEF. REPRESENTATION
(NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N 1995).

§§ 6.1(a)-6.2(a)

99. Id. § 6.3(b). The publications of local defender offices set out similar duties, as discussed
in Todd A. Berger, After Frye and Lafler: The ConstitutionalRight to Defense Counsel Who Plea
Bargains, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 121, 140-44 (2014) and Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea
BargainingCounsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2666-68 (2013).
100. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2010).
101. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
102. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
103. See Berger, supra note 99, at 135-37; Roberts, supranote 99, at 2662.
104. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977).
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of whether a plea bargain is in their best interests under the
circumstances." 5 However, care must be exercised because, "[w]hile
lawyers must not substitute their own ends for their clients', they should
06
inform and advise clients about less biased means to those ends."
Thus, in the plea bargaining process, defense attorneys ought to
provide zealous advocacy and wise counsel, based on sufficient
investigation and knowledge, effective negotiation with the prosecutor,
and the need to both advise a client and respect that client's decisions.
Those duties are unsurprising, yet, given the reality of the plea
bargaining process in the American criminal justice system, their
satisfaction can nonetheless lead to hard questions for the defense
attorney to resolve.
B. Plea Bargainingin Practice
[Mlost of us don't become criminal defense lawyers because we
want to make innocent people plead guilty, but the system stinks. And
here's someone who 'd been locked up for ten years in a maximum
security prison and everybody knew that the court of appeals was going
to reverse. There's this one moment, this one opportunity to free
her, and I would have done everything within my power to get her to
pleadguilty.'07
In a perfect criminal justice system, plea bargains would not
produce hard questions for defense counsel. An accused with a strong
case, legally or factually, could choose to go to trial without fear of
wrongful conviction or unduly punitive consequences. An accused with
a weaker case, legally or factually, could negotiate a plea bargain that
reflects the benefit to himself and the state from avoiding a trial, and
which would allow him to take responsibility for his actions. Further, the
lawyer could give information to the accused, and the accused could
independently make a rational and informed decision about how to
proceed. In these circumstances, any negotiated disposition of the trial
could be understood to reflect a form of freedom of contract and the
autonomous choice of the accused person.' The criminal justice system
is, of course, far from perfect. And, its imperfections create hard
questions for the defense attorney.

105. Bibas, supra note 91, at 2519-27.
106. Id.at 2519; see also Strutin, supra note 91, at 831-33.
107. Frontline:The Plea, supra note 82 (statement of Abbe Smith).
108. Strutin, supranote 91, at 829-31.
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Most obviously, a person who ought to be entitled to an acquittal
after a fair trial on the merits is in no way guaranteed to receive one. The
accused may be the victim of unfortunate circumstances, of having been
in the wrong place at the wrong time, such that the prosecution has a
plausible case. The accused may have a defense lawyer who is
underfunded with an unrealistic caseload, who lacks the resources
necessary to mount a defense, or who is incompetent or idle. The judge
or jury may be ignorant, inclined to conviction, or prejudiced in some
other relevant respect. The prosecution or police may engage in abusive
tactics, such as manipulation or non-disclosure of evidence." 9 A person
innocent in fact or law who has the misfortune to be charged with a
crime has at least some risk of wrongful conviction and may have a
material risk, depending on the circumstances of the case.110
In the event of a wrongful conviction at trial, an innocent person
may also face severe penal consequences. This is true if the crime with
which she is charged is serious, as was the case for Kelly,111 but it is also
true for less serious offenses given sentencing guidelines and rules
applicable to state and federal crimes. 12 While efforts have been made
more recently to reduce the severity of punishment attached to certain
crimes, it is still the case that conviction at trial can result in lengthy
periods of incarceration for a wide range of federal and state offenses.113
Further, depending on their economic circumstances, their prior criminal
record, and the nature of the crime with which they were charged, some
innocent accused spend significant time in pretrial detention. They may
also risk consequences other than imprisonment if they go to trial, such
as deportation or the requirement that they register as a sex offender. 114
The innocent accused may receive plea offers from the prosecutor
that are significantly less onerous than the consequences that could arise
from conviction at trial. Given the pressure on prosecutors to avoid trial
losses, and the legislative expectation that prosecutors will use
109. Id. at 872 ("There is too much documentation to deny the perils of criminal prosecutions
that can lead to wrongful incarceration, such as: (1) official misconduct, (2) false confessions, (3)
misidentification, (4) bad forensics, (5) witness perjury, (6) ineffective defense counsel, (7) underresourced defense counsel, (8) CSI effect, and (9) racial profiling.").
110. To be clear, this is not a feature unique to American criminal justice. For example, a
Canadian criminal defense lawyer attested to telling his client prior to accepting a plea as follows:
"[T]he Appellant advised me that the allegations made against him were not the truth. I advised the
Appellant that criminal courts do not necessarily deal in truth, but they deal in evidence and
explained to him carefully what the difference was." R. v. K. (S.) [1995] 99 C.C.C. (3d) 376, 379
(Can. Ont. C.A.).
111. See supra Part II.A.
112. Bibas, supra note 91, at 2467.
113. Green, supra note 91, at 737-38.
114. Berger, supranote 99, at 138-40.
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mandatory sentences and sentencing guidelines to negotiate a plea,
prosecutors have both incentives and the power to make attractive plea
offers to accused who have stronger cases, which the factually or legally
innocent accused is likely to have.115 An accused with a strong case has
a better chance of prevailing at trial, which is not in the prosecutor's
interest, and the prosecutor has the power to offer that accused a
significantly reduced sentence from what would be imposed in the event
of a trial conviction. The plea power may also allow the innocent
accused to get out of pretrial detention or to avoid non-penal
consequences of conviction at trial, such as deportation or registration as
1 16
a sex offender.
At the same time, however, the plea offer will impose costs on
the accused. It will involve some admission of wrongdoing, and as
a consequence, it will require the accused to lie. It may seek to have
the accused participate in the prosecution of a third party, even if
the accused cannot do so honestly. 117 It may, and usually will, involve
a period of incarceration. In addition, the plea offer will involve
the waiver of constitutional rights-at minimum the right to a trial,
and at worst the waiver of rights to appeal or to seek exoneration.118
It may involve other consequences in relation to immigration or
civil forfeiture.119
Also of note for plea bargaining in practice is the difficulty for any
accused to assess accurately the desirability of accepting a plea when
offered. The difficulties arise, first, because of the sheer complexity of
the criminal justice process. As Ken Strutin observes, a person deciding
whether to accept a plea "must play out the entire trial in her imagination
and filter through the penal code, criminal procedure, and evidence law,
as well as forensic science."' 2 ° He suggests that absent "adequate
investigation and legal analysis, the decision to plead or to go to trial
'
will be poorly made."121
An accused deciding on the best course of
action faces a considerable challenge, even in the best-case scenario,
where she has good information and the ability to rationally assess
her alternatives.

115. Bibas, supra note 91, at 2471-72.
116. Green, supra note 91, at 764.
117.

See Kevin C. McMunigal, Defense Counsel and Plea Bargain Perjury, 7 01HO ST. J.

CRIM. L. 653, 656-57 (2010).
118. Alexandra W. Reimelt, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right to
Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REv. 871, 876-77 (2010).

119.
120.

Green, supranote 91, at 743, 764.
Strutin, supra note 91, at 832.

121.

Id.
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And, the accused is rarely, or never, in the best-case scenario to
make that rational assessment. Much of the time, the accused makes the
decision about whether to plead with insufficient information and with
inadequate discovery from the prosecution. 122 He also may have
concerns apart from the risk of conviction and the penal consequences
associated with conviction, particularly if he is in pretrial detention or is
worried about deportation or the requirement to register as a sex
offender. 123 The accused also has psychological barriers to making a
rational assessment of the plea. As Stephanos Bibas persuasively
documented, overconfidence, loss aversion, risk aversion, risk-taking,
and discounting of future costs may all affect an accused's ability to
assess a plea. 124 Innocent defendants may be particularly unable to assess
the risks and rewards associated with a plea given evidence that
perceptions of unfairness may make them reluctant to accept a plea, even
when it is in their best interests to do SO. 125 In a review of exoneration
cases from 1998-2003, only six percent of the persons exonerated had
126
pled guilty.
In practice, a legally or factually innocent accused may face a
reasonable prospect of conviction at trial, severe penal and other
consequences if convicted, a relatively favorable plea bargain offer from
the prosecution, and a very limited ability to independently reach a
rational decision as to the most prudent course of action. It is in these
circumstances that the hard questions for the defense lawyer arise.
C. The HardQuestion
And, I regret it every day of my life, every day of my life. I could
have insisted-I think I could have-as I've often thought,I should have
reached across the table and grabbed her by the throat and said, "I'll
quit. I won't representyou. You must do this. You have no choice. "And,
these last-these last [twenty] years, she'd have been with us instead of
buried in there.
Well at the end of the day, in this case, evidently the client had
certain values that she places above liberty. You know, it's a sad thing,
and what occasions it is the conviction of an innocent person. But from
the lawyer's perspective, you have to respect the client's decision at the
122.
123.

Bibas, supra note 91, at 2493-95.
Green, supra note 91, 740-41; see also Jason A. Cade, Plea-Bargain Crisis for

Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REv. 1751, 1754-56 (2013).

124.

Bibas, supranote 91, at 2495-2502, 2504-12.

125. Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J.
EMPIRcAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 113-14 (2010).

126.

Id. at 98-100.
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end of the day. If she understands what the stakes are and she knows her
own values, she's entitled to say, "I just won't say I'm guilty, because
I'm not."
I would have made herpleadguilty. I would have been relentless. I
would have brought her brother up to Bedford Hills Prison to put
pressure on her to plead [guilty]. I would have brought herfather, who
was aging and infirm, up there to Bedford Hills Prison.If I had to drive
down to North Carolinamyself and put them in my car, I would have
brought them up to the prison and I would have ganged up on her. And
I-and I-and I would have had them beg her. And I, and I would have
had them cry. And I would have had them say, "Please,"you know "you
only have this one life. " I-I-you know, "I don't" I would have had
herfather say "Idon't want to die while you-when you're in prison."
And, I would have said to Kelly, "You know what, you can fightfor your
good name outside the prison walls but get out first."127
In Freedman's analysis, a hard question arises when the moral
values of the legal system or society conflict, when a lawyer's
satisfaction of one moral value requires sacrifice of another. 128 A lawyer
participating in a plea negotiation for the factually or legally innocent
client will face hard questions. Given her legal and ethical duties, she
cannot be a passive bystander in relation to her client's decision. She
must help her client determine the costs and benefits associated with
accepting or rejecting the plea, 129 and she must do so taking into account
the psychological and informational distortions that impair the client's
ability to assess the circumstances accurately and rationally. At the same
time, those legal and ethical duties make it clear that while she needs to
advise the client as to the costs and benefits associated with accepting or
rejecting the plea, she ought not to substitute her own judgment for the
client's, that it is ultimately the client's decision about whether to accept
the plea.13 °
That statement of the lawyer's ethical duties tends, however, to
obscure the difficulty and cost of fulfilling them. If the lawyer persuades
the client to accept the plea, either aggressively or with some restraint,
the lawyer will likely have helped the client achieve a far better outcome
than if the client had gone to trial and been wrongfully convicted. As
Bruce Barket said in The Plea, however bad it may be to stand beside an
innocent person accepting a relatively favorable disposition after a false
127.
128.
129.
130.

Frontline: The Plea, supranote 82.
Freedman, supra note 1, at 1471-72.
Roberts, supra note 99, at 2652-53.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
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guilty plea, it is far better than standing beside that person while they are
wrongfully convicted and face an extensive period of incarceration,
along with other potentially serious consequences."I
The lawyer who does so, however, will also have actively
participated in the subversion of the truth. Especially if the client is
factually innocent, in whole or in part, the client will attest to the
commission of an offense that she did not commit. She may commit
perjury and, depending on the nature of the plea she is offered, she may
commit perjury in her own case and also in that of a third party.' 3 2 The
lawyer will also have assisted in maintaining an unjust legal system,
which depends on the prevalence of plea bargaining to function, and
which arguably does so only because everyone goes along with it.' 33
Further, she will have pressured her client to accept a punishment the
client does not deserve and forego constitutional rights to which her
client is entitled. It may be that the punishment will be less than the
client would have received at trial, but the lawyer will have contributed
to that outcome rather than resisting it. Finally, given the psychological
conditions under which clients consider plea bargains, and particularly
overconfidence, a resistance to accepting an unfair consequence, and a
discounting of future costs, a lawyer may only be able to get a client to
accept a plea through applying considerable pressure. In those
circumstances, it may not be possible to both ensure that the client
makes a rational decision and that, in fact, it is the client who does so.
The lawyer may in effect undermine the client's own commitments and
autonomous choices about the best way to receive justice.
If you do not push your client aggressively to take the plea, you will
avoid some of these issues. You will respect your client's own choice
about how to proceed and will not have pushed your client to accept an
unjust result. Your client will enjoy the constitutional rights to which she
is entitled. On the other hand, the client may well face far more
significant consequences, and an even greater substantive injustice, than
if you had pushed them to take the plea. Their decision may be informed
by ignorance or psychological weaknesses-by an unwarranted faith in
the "American system of justice" or a simple unwillingness to accept
how the evidence against them will be perceived in court. The client will
131. See Frontline: The Plea, supranote 82.
132. Although I do not think a lawyer could justify participating in a client's perjury that
contributes to the conviction of another person, even if that perjury was a necessary condition of the
client receiving a favorable plea, to do so would be an ethical error, not a defensible response to a
hard question. See McMunigal, supra note 117, at 657-58.
133. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYsIs 737, 740 (2009).
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have reached the decision because their counsel was unwilling to do
what was necessary for them to appreciate the reality of their situation.
Regardless of how much plausible deniability you will have in that case
or how much ability you will have to say that you resisted the injustice
rather than participating, it will have occurred because of a decision you
made not to push your client to take the plea in the first place.
The defense attorney in circumstances like these thus faces a hard
question-whatever choice she makes will involve trading off moral and
normative values. The only response she can make to that hard question
is to make a conscientious assessment of her legal and ethical
obligations, in light of her role in the legal system and given the specific
circumstances of the client's case. The duties to advocate on the client's
behalf while respecting the client's choices, the duty to pursue a good
plea bargain for a client, the likelihood of the client's conviction at trial,
the differences in consequences between the plea and conviction at trial,
and the client's ability to make an independent decision, all ought to
inform whether and how hard the lawyer pushes the factually or legally
innocent client to accept the plea. But, whatever the lawyer decides, the
choice will both satisfy and sacrifice moral values.
In facing this hard question, the defense attorney's situation is
distinct from other circumstances in the plea bargaining process in which
lawyers face crummy situations or make moral mistakes. Moral mistakes
in plea bargaining include prosecutors overcharging accused to create
room to plea, prosecutors failing to disclose information relevant to the
accused's decision about whether to plea, and prosecutors proceeding to
trial against innocent accused. They also include defense lawyers who
fail to deliver plea offers to their clients, who provide wrong advice to
their clients, or who do not discuss the implications of a plea with their
clients. In each of these cases, the lawyers have failed to discharge their
ethical and legal duties and have violated moral norms without any
countervailing moral justification.
Plea bargaining also gives rise to crummy situations. The limited
resources dedicated to defending indigent clients, and even to some
prosecutors' offices, mean that those lawyers can only fulfill their ethical
obligations in a minimal way. Those lawyers may not act wrongfully,
but they do not do the work that their legal and ethical duties assert to
be necessary, and which would satisfy the moral values underlying the
legal system.
Again though, even if those crummy situations and moral mistakes
were to be eliminated, so long as a legally or factually innocent client
risks wrongful conviction and severe consequences and is offered a
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favorable disposition by plea, defense attorneys will encounter and have
to resolve hard questions for which there is no certain ethical answer.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When he published The Three Hardest Questions fifty years ago,
Monroe Freedman elucidated three challenging questions for defense
attorneys representing clients at trial.' 34 In that article and in his
subsequent work, however, he also created a structure for thinking about
ethical problems, for understanding when hard questions arise, the moral
values at stake, and how lawyers ought to resolve them. That framework
allows thoughtful consideration of the ethical challenges of defense
attorneys in other contexts-such as plea bargaining-but it also allows
consideration of the ethical challenges for lawyers more generally.
Lawyers representing clients like Kelly, faced with a choice
between admitting to the commission of a "horrible" crime they did not
commit or decades of incarceration, face a true moral dilemma.135 They
cannot fulfill their ethical duties without also sacrificing them, whether it
is their client's best interests, autonomy, justice, or truth. Freedman's
framework helps explain the nature of the dilemma they face and why,
as he put it, "the only immorality lies in failing to address and resolve
136
the moral conflict in a conscientious and responsible manner.

134. Freedman, supranote 1.
135. Frontline: The Plea, supranote 82; see supra Part H1.A.
136. Freedman, supra note 5, at 28.
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